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THIRD-PARTY INSTITUTIONAL PROXY ADVISORS:
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND ROADS TO REFORM
Matthew Fagan*
ABSTRACT
With the rise of institutional activist investors in recent decades—including a
purported 495 activist campaigns against U.S. corporations in 2016 alone1—the
role that third-party institutional proxy advisors play in corporate governance has
greatly increased. The United States Office of Government Accountability estimates
that clients of the top five proxy advisory firms account for about $41.5 trillion in
equity throughout the world.2 For several years, discussions have developed regard-
ing conflicts of interest faced by proxy advisors. For example, Institutional
Shareholder Services, the top proxy advisory firm in the world, frequently provides
advice to institutional investors on how to vote proxies while simultaneously pro-
viding corporate clients with advice on how to improve their corporate governance.3
Situations like these have given rise to debate as to whether such conflicts are truly
problematic.
At a minimum, institutional investors must be confident in the services that are
provided to them by proxy advisors. Without a showing that recommendations are
given in a neutral and non-biased way, accidentally or intentionally, the system
cannot work effectively to maximize shareholder fairness.
This Note posits that, despite the fact that third-party proxy advisors are cur-
rently acting within the law, reforms should be made that better address and limit
the amount of conflicts of interest that may arise as a result of their business. Such
reform should take place through legislation, informal SEC notice and comment,
or, potentially, through the voluntary action of proxy advisory firms.
INTRODUCTION
Third-party proxy advisors play an immensely important role in
matters of corporate governance. Studies find that in the context of
* Graduate, December 2017, University of Michigan Law School. I cannot thank the
editorial team on the Michigan Journal of Law Reform enough for their hard work and
immense help with every aspect of this Note. I would particularly like to thank Michael
Darling, Margaret Abernethy, and Anna Greve for their amazing work.
1. Andrew Birstingl, 2016 Shareholder Activism Trends, FACTSET INSIGHT (Dec. 12, 2016),
accessed at: https://insight.factset.com/2016-shareholder-activism-trends.
2. U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEET-
INGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 13
(2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf.
3. Id. at 4.
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“say-on-pay” votes, proxy advisor recommendations are the deter-
mining factor in voting outcomes.4 Another study shows that
advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),
have an impact on shareholder votes: directors who received nega-
tive recommendations received nineteen percent fewer votes at the
outcome.5 While the precise extent of a proxy advisory firm’s influ-
ence is widely debated,6 one thing is certain: third-party proxy
advisory firms are key players in corporate governance.
Of the major proxy advisory firms, only ISS is under the regula-
tory purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).7
Glass Lewis, the world’s second largest proxy advisor, is not under
the purview of the SEC.8 Given the extensive conflicts of interest
issues confronted by firms such as ISS and Glass Lewis, it is worth
wondering whether more firms should be under closer scrutiny of
the SEC. This Note argues that such conflicts of interest are unsus-
tainable and inherently run counter to the values and interests of
the institutional investors that third-party proxy advisors regularly
represent. Accordingly, this Note proposes a number of reforms
meant to specifically deal with conflicts of interest.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of institutional third-party
proxy advisors. Part II discusses the role that proxy advisors have
come to play in the realm of corporate governance in the United
States, the current regulatory environment, and recent regulatory
proposals. Part III discusses the legal duties that proxy advisory
firms may owe to their clients. Part IV reviews the existing literature
on conflicts of interest within proxy advisory firms and seeks to
make a determination as to whether or not such conflicts are truly
problematic. Finally, Part V advocates three reforms: legislation, a
complete regulatory overhaul of the proxy advisory industry, and
voluntary SEC disclosure by proxy advisory firms through Form
ADV.
4. Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors:
Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 951 (2013); see also infra note 37.
5. Jei Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389,
2391 (2009).
6. See generally U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2.
7. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., Comment Letter to Dodd-Frank Investor
Advisory Committee 6 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-28/26528-271.
pdf.
8. Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation, Transparency, and Regulatory Accounta-
bility: Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance
Professionals & the National Investor Relations Institute) [hereinafter Society of Corporate Secre-
taries Statement].
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I. THE HISTORY OF THIRD-PARTY INSTITUTIONAL PROXY ADVISORS
Simply stated, proxy advisors give advice to shareholders and in-
stitutional investors on how to vote their shares in major corporate
decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions, director elections, ex-
ecutive compensation, and various policies related to corporate
governance.9 Several individuals believe the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) dramatically changed the
landscape for corporate governance matters in the United States.10
ERISA imposes upon voter proxies the duty to vote in a reasonable
manner for matters involving fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans.11 Shortly after the enactment of ERISA, those in control of
pension plans and other financial vehicles managed by institutional
investors began to concern themselves with the placement of board
members, the implementation of shareholder proposals, and other
matters, in order to comply with this newfound fiduciary duty.12
However, the vast number of portfolio companies that existed at
the time made it difficult to carefully review all of the necessary
information.13
These circumstances led to the creation of ISS in 1985; ISS was
founded for the purpose of “promoting good corporate govern-
ance and raising the level of active and informed proxy voting
among institutional investors.”14 Since its establishment, ISS has re-
mained the largest proxy advisory service in the world, “cover[ing]
almost 40,000 meetings in 115 countries and having over 1,600 in-
stitutional clients.”15 The next two largest proxy advisory firms are
Glass Lewis and, less widely known in the United States, Manifest.16
While ERISA created an opportunity for proxy advisory firms to
enter the market, a number of SEC rulings in 2003 paved the way
9. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-
Discontinuity Design, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3394, 3394 (2016).
10. See CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY
STATUS QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT, (2011), http://on-
line.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf.
11. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. Reg.
61,731, 61,732–34 (Oct. 11, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
12. Michael R. Levin, Proxy Advisors, ACTIVIST INV., http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/
The_Activist_Investor/Proxy_Advisors.html [https://web.archive.org/web/201801262347
07/http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/The_Activist_Investor/Proxy_Advisors.html] (last
visited Jan. 26, 2018).
13. Id.
14. ISS History, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., http://www.issgovernance.com/
about/iss-history/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
15. See Malenko & Shen, supra note 9, at 3394.
16. See Company Overview, GLASS LEWIS, http://www.glasslewis.com [https://web.archive.
org/web/20180126235339/http://www.glasslewis.com/company-overview/] (last visited Jan.
26, 2018); See also MANIFEST, http://www.manifest.co.uk (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
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for the exponential influence that these firms hold today.17 The
rules provide increased regulation for proxy advisory firms under
the jurisdiction of the SEC and also allow institutional investors to
rely on advice from those proxy advisory firms to fulfill their fiduci-
ary obligations to clients when they vote their shares.18 While this
was a good starting point, as explained in Part III, ISS is the only
proxy advisory firm registered with the SEC.19 Thus, while the rule
generally has the potential to impose greater regulation on proxy
advisory firms, it only relates to one firm in the country.
II. ROLE OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS AND
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The role of proxy advisory firms has increased greatly in correla-
tion with the increase in equity ownership by activist investors. The
amount of public equity owned by institutional investors, for exam-
ple, increased from eight percent in 1950 to about sixty-seven
percent in 2010.20 Many scholars attribute this increase to the
greater participation that average institutional investors show in
mutual funds and exchange traded funds.21 Regardless of their
causes, one thing is certain: with this increased amount of power,
institutional investors possess a significant influence over a wide ar-
ray of corporate governance matters, including executive
compensation, director elections, and removals.22
A. The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms
Proxy advisory firms are generally thought to provide two types of
services to their activist-investor clients:
17. See Interpretative Releases Relating to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R.
§ 276 (2017); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, 274 (2017).
18. Allan L. McCall & David F. Larcker, Researchers: The Power of Proxy Advisory Firms,
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS.: CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.
edu/insights/researchers-power-proxy-advisory-firms.
19. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 7, at 2.
20. Louis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Institutional Investors:
Power and Responsibility, Address at Georgia State University J. Mack College of Business
(Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808.
21. Id.
22. See CAROL HANSALL & ROBERT MURPHY, DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS &VINEBERG LLP, THE
ROLE OF THE PROXY ADVISORY FIRM: WHAT DIRECTORS NEED TO KNOW 1 (2011), https://www.
dwpv.com/sites/shareholdervoting/media/TheRoleoftheProxyAdvisoryFirm.pdf.
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First, they provide their clients with the complex mechanics of
managing their voting rights. Second, they provide research
and analysis relevant to the issues on which their clients are
entitled to vote and make recommendations about how those
votes should be cast. Although these two types of services are
separate (and some institutions use one service, but not the
other) they are highly synergistic. Many institutional investors
see economies in outsourcing all of the functions associated
with exercising their voting rights to one proxy advisory firm.23
The increase in the role of proxy advisory firms has unsurpris-
ingly brought with it a lot of concern from different players in the
corporate world. Because of this increase, the SEC has numerously
called for proposals and roundtables to discuss the topic.24 For ex-
ample, former SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar in 2013
commented, “proxy advisory firms may exercise out-sized influence
on shareholder voting” and the “Dodd-Frank provisions, such as
mandatory say-on-pay votes, make proxy advisory firms potentially
even more influential.”25 Public and private concerns, thus, have
paved the way for a—albeit weak—regulatory regime surrounding
proxy advisory firms.
The amount of influence firms actually have on voting outcomes
has been widely debated.26 In 2009, three professors, using empiri-
cal evidence, determined that available corporate governance
rankings provided by proxy advisors were not useful information
for shareholders.27 In coming to this conclusion, the authors ex-
amined Corporate Governance Quotients (CGQ), GMIs (a measure
of governance quality produced by Governance Metrics Interna-
tional), and TCLs (a rating produced by The Corporate Library).28
Regarding CGQ, a higher rating from ISS was associated with lower
Tobin’s Q (a ratio of the market value of a company’s assets), and
23. Id. at 3.




25. Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Proxy
Advisory Services Round Table (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
2013-12-05-opening-statement-roundtable-msp.
26. See Letter from Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs to U.S. Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, The Regulation of Proxy Advisory Firms (Sept.
6, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/26/the-regulation-of-proxy-advisory-
firms/.
27. Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating and Ratings: How Good Are
Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. Fin. Econ. 439, 439 (2010).
28. Id. at 440.
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in some models more class action lawsuits.29 Further, and more im-
portantly, ISS “sub-scores” (low scores) that rate the quality of a
firm’s audit review and board of directors resulted in better govern-
ance ratings yielding worse results.30 Thus, ratings provided by ISS
and other proxy advisory firms are not always clairvoyant and will
frequently get things wrong.
Others have pointed out the difficulty of accurately measuring
cause and effect of proxy advisory firms due to an omitted variable
problem.31 The problem is that the “same unobservable firm char-
acteristics that lead ISS to give a negative recommendation can also
lead shareholders to withdraw their support for the proposal, lead-
ing to an upward bias in the estimates of the ISS effect.”32
Scholars on the other side of the argument assert that, at the very
least, there is a positive correlation between recommendations and
shareholder votes.33 Findings have shown that a negative recom-
mendation from ISS has an influence on between 13.6% and 20.6%
of votes cast on “management-sponsored proposals.”34 Further, dur-
ing 2011, “no company that received a positive recommendation
failed its say-on-pay vote, and 12% of companies that received a neg-
ative recommendation from ISS failed their say-on-pay vote.”35
Whether or not recommendations to corporate clients have a large
impact on corporate governance policy is seldom a subject of great
debate. For example, corporations like Aetna and GE that em-
ployed ISS services to recommend governance changes saw the
changes lift their ratings from 10% to more than 90%.36 Addition-
ally, it is generally understood that third-party proxy advisors have
somewhat of an effect on “say-on-pay” outcomes, depending princi-
pally on the ownership structure of a given corporation.37
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Malenko & Shen, supra note 9, at 3395.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 4, at 951; David F. Larcker et al., Out-
sourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 173 (2012); David F.
Larcker et al., The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations, DIRECTOR NOTES,
Mar. 2012, at 1, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-survey-
2012-proxy-voting_0.pdf.
34. Larcker et al., The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations, supra note
33, at 3.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Daines et al., supra note 27, at 440; see also Monica Langley, ISS Rates Firms—
And Sells Roadmap to Boosting Score, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2003, 12:38 AM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB105485006531971100.
37. Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van Der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 653, 657 (2015).
SPRING 2018] Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors 627
B. The Regulatory Environment for Proxy Advisory Firms
The proxy advisory industry is subject to few, if any, regulations.
Indeed, some have referred to the regulations as a “patchwork
quilt.”38 One such regulation within the “patchwork quilt” is the In-
vestment Advisors Act of 1940, which ISS is registered under.39
While critics maintain that the rules of this particular Act do not
accurately reflect the role that proxy advisory firms play (for exam-
ple, proxy advisory firms don’t select securities),40 registration with
this Act has led to SEC enforcement in the past and at the very
least, shows that the firm is under some sort of scrutiny.41
While ISS has regulations to comply with, the second largest
firm, Glass Lewis, is not registered as an investment adviser.42 In
fact, Glass Lewis is not registered under any securities statutes what-
soever, meaning that it is not subject to any statutes enforced by the
SEC.43  Thus, no fiduciary duty is enforced against Glass Lewis—a
company whose customers as of 2005 managed nearly $8 trillion
total.44
Another feature of the current regulatory framework provides
advisory firms with leeway in the United States: Exchange Act Rule
14a-2(b).45 This is an SEC created exemption for proxy advisors
subject to SEC regulation. The rule provides that proxy advisory
firms are not required to abide by the solicitation and disclosure
rules applicable to other proxy participants.46 The effect is that
their reports are not subject to outside review or oversight of any
kind.47
38. See Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement, supra note 8, at 4. “Patchwork Quilt,” as
used above, refers to the terminology used by the National Investor Relations Institute when
describing the regulatory state for third-party institutional proxy advisors. It essentially means
that the regulations currently in place allow for many loopholes and evasion by proxy advi-
sory firms.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012).
40. See generally CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 10.
41. See, e.g., Institutional S’holder Servs., Exchange Act Release No. 3611, 2013 WL
11113059 (May 23, 2013) (ISS was charged with willfully violating 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (2012)
when an employee provided proxy solicitation materials to an insider).
42. Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement supra note 8, at 4; CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra
note 10, at 33.
43. Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement supra note 8, at 4.
44. Press Release, Glass Lewis, Glass Lewis Achieves Dominant Market Share Among
Largest Money Managers and Plan Sponsors (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.glasslewis.com/
glass-lewis-achieves-dominant-market-share-among-largest-money-managers-and-plan-spon-
sors/.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (2017).
46. Id.
47. Id.
628 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:3
Rule 14a-2(b)(3) of the Exchange Act also requires proxy advi-
sory firms to disclose any significant relationship with a soliciting
company, shareowner proponent, or material interest in a matter
that is materially related to the subject of a voting recommendation
provided by the firm.48 Anti-reform advocates argue that this regula-
tion is sufficient to adequately protect from conflicts of interest and
other transparency concerns.49 The problem, however, is that not
all proxy advisory firms are subject to this statute.50 Thus, whatever
regulatory implications may exist, application of the rule is inconsis-
tent towards the industry as a whole.
C. Recent Attempts at Ramping Up the Regulatory Environment
for Proxy Advisors
Despite the “patchwork quilt” regulating proxy advisory firms,51
there have been many different attempts to increase transparency
and oversight in the industry over the years. Two pieces of pro-
posed legislation in the most recent Congress—the Corporate
Governance Reform and Transparency Act (CGRTA) and the Fi-
nancial Choice Act of 2016—made this attempt and sparked a lot of
debate amongst industry insiders.52
The CGRTA, proposed by Congressman Sean Duffy, sought to
“improve the quality of proxy advisory firms for the protection of
investors and the U.S. economy, and in the public interest, by fos-
tering accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and
competition . . . .”53 Principally, the bill: (1) required proxy advisory
firms to register with the SEC;54 (2) required commission oversight
of firms in making their voting recommendations available to com-
panies in advance of publication;55 (3) required that advisory firms
employ an ombudsman to receive complaints;56 (4) required firms
to disclose potential conflicts of interest;57 and (5) required firms to
48. § 240.14a-2(b)(3).
49. Letter from Fiona Reynolds, Managing Dir., Principles for Responsible Inv., to Hon.
Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., & Hon. Maxine Waters, Ranking
Member, House Comm. on Fin. Servs. (June 13, 2016), https://www.unpri.org/download_re
port/21526.
50. See Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement, supra note 8, at 4–5.
51. See Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement, supra note 8, at 4.
52. Financial Choice Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016); Corporate Govern-
ance Reform and Transparency Act, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong. (2016).
53. H.R. 5311 at 1.
54. Id. § 15H(a).
55. Id. § 15H(g)(1).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 15H(f)(1).
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disclose procedures and methodologies for formulating proxy rec-
ommendations.58 The proposed bill was met with considerable
criticism and never made it out of committee.59
The Financial Choice Act of 2016, introduced by House Finan-
cial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling,60 took a larger
approach by focusing beyond the realm of proxy advisory firms.
The Act, like the CGRTA, required registration of proxy advisory
firms with the SEC.61 But additionally, the Act mandated that firms
disclose annually to the SEC methodologies and procedures in de-
veloping recommendations, the organizational structure of firms,
potential conflicts of interest, and many financial details.62 The Act,
framed as an alternative to Dodd-Frank, was also subject to criticism
and later died in committee.63
III. LEGAL DUTIES OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
It is worth briefly mentioning that some proxy advisory firms do
have legal duties imposed on them. The determining factor for
whether a proxy advisory firm is subject to fiduciary duties is if they
are registered as “investment advisers” with the SEC.64 As previously
stated, ISS, the world’s largest proxy advisory service,65 is registered
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and is subject to fiduci-
ary duties.66
58. Id. § 15H(l); see also Bonnie Barsamian & Marc Leaf, Proxy Advisory Firms in the Regu-
latory Spotlight, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2016, 11:10 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/869646/
proxy-advisory-firms-in-the-regulatory-spotlight.
59. See Actions Overview: H.R.5311, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/5311/actions [https://web.archive.org/web/20180128202255/https://
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5311/actions] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018);
see, e.g., David Bogoslaw, Major Investors Gear Up to Oppose Bill Regulating Proxy Advisors, IR MAG.
(July 19, 2016), https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-meetings/21534/
major-investors-gear-oppose-bill-regulating-proxy-advisers/; Jeff Mahoney, 2 House Bills That
Could Harm Investors, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.corporatecom-
plianceinsights.com/2-house-bills-harm-investors/; Gary Retelny, Taking the Ax to Corporate
Accountability, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 13, 2016), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/13/taking-the-ax-to-corporate-accountability/.
60. Financial Choice Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016).
61. Id. § 1082; see Cydney Posner, Undo Dodd-Frank?, COOLEY PUBCO (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://cooleypubco.com/2016/11/09/undo-dodd-frank/.
62. H.R. 5983 § 15H(b).
63. See Actions Overview: H.R.5983, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/5983/actions (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
64. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 7, at 5.
65. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2.
66. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 7, at 5. Section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 has a list of prohibited transactions for investment advisers
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The leading case on fiduciary duty under the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940 is SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.67 The
Supreme Court in Capital Gains determined that the Act reflects
Congress’s recognition of the fiduciary nature of an investment ad-
visory relationship.68 Proxy advisory firms meet the definition of
investment adviser because they are paid to give analyses regarding
securities and provide advice on their value.69 Due to this, ISS has
the “affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclo-
sure of all material facts, as well as an affirmative obligation to
employ reasonable care to avoid misleading [its] clients.”70
Capital Gains thus imposes a fiduciary duty on those registered
under the Investment Advisers Act and also forces them to disclose
material conflicts of interest.71 However, the conflicts disclosures
made by ISS have been criticized for their vagueness and lack of
information.72 Furthermore, Glass Lewis and other large proxy advi-
sory firms are not registered under the Act (or any other
legislation), and thus owe no fiduciary duties to their clients and
are not forced to disclose material conflicts of interest.73 The only
reason that ISS is even subject to the Investment Advisers Act is be-
cause other parts of its business fall within it.74 The question
examined in the next two sections is whether disclosure is enough,
and if not, what else should be required of proxy advisory firms?
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
There are four principal potential conflicts of interest that may
arise at proxy advisory firms: (1) ISS and other firms “advise[ ] insti-
tutional clients on how to vote their proxies and at the same time
provide consulting services to help corporations develop manage-
ment proposals and improve their corporation governance”;75 (2)
and has the effect of creating a fiduciary duty on those advisers to not engage in those trans-
actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
67. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 7, at 5.
68. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
69. Concept Release on the US Proxy System (“Concept Release”), Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-62495, 75 Fed. Reg. 42982, 43010 (July 22, 2010) (codified at 17 CFR pts. 240,
270, 274 (2017).
70. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 194 (internal quotations omitted)
(footnotes omitted).
71. Id.
72. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 194.
73. See Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement, supra note 8, at 6.
74. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 7, at 4. (explaining how ISS
became subject to fiduciary duties due to its connection with ERISA).
75. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 4.
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there are potential conflicts related to firms providing recommen-
dations on shareholder initiatives backed by owners or institutional
investors who are also clients;76 (3) there are conflicts where own-
ers, executives, or staff of proxy advisory firms have ownership
interests, or serve on the board of, companies which they make rec-
ommendations on;77 and (4) there are conflicts when proxy
advisory firms are “owned by firms that provide other financial ser-
vices to various types of clients.”78
A few problems could plausibly arise due to these conflicts. First,
advising on both sides could result in corporations feeling obli-
gated to retain proxy advisory services in order to obtain favorable
voting recommendations.79 Scholars have argued that it is impossi-
ble for firms such as ISS to meet their fiduciary duties while
providing both of these services.80 The second concern that arises is
that “proxy advisory firms will make favorable recommendations to
other institutional investor clients on such proposals in order to
maintain the business of the investor clients that submitted these
proposals.”81 There are persuasive arguments on both sides of this
debate as to whether and to what extent such conflicts of interest
pose problems. Put succinctly by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO):
ISS could help a corporate client design an executive compen-
sation proposal to be voted on by shareholders and
subsequently make a recommendation to investor clients to
vote for this proposal. Some industry professionals also con-
tend that corporations could feel obligated to subscribe to
ISS’s consulting services in order to obtain favorable proxy
vote recommendations on their proposals and favorable cor-
porate governance ratings.82
76. CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 10, at 42.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 4.
80. CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 10, at 61; see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1287, 1321–26 (2014).
81. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 12; see also Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 201 (explaining that the high standards of business morality
which regulate the securities industry don’t permit an investment adviser to trade on the
market effect of their own recommendations without fairly revealing his personal ties in
these recommendation to their own clients).
82. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 10.
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Despite what many scholars would argue, this is a huge problem
that must be addressed by Congress, the SEC, or the industry it-
self.83 Corporations should only employ advisory firms if they want
to, and shareholders need to be able to trust that the recommenda-
tions they receive are neutral and non-biased.
The leading advocate for reform regarding third-party proxy ad-
visors is Tao Li, Finance Professor at Warrington College of
Business. His article, “Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Con-
flicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry,” was the first to
provide empirical evidence that “conflicts of interest are a real con-
cern in the proxy advisory industry . . . .”84 Professor Li showed this
effect by examining the entry of Glass Lewis into ISS’s market
space. His findings demonstrated that increased competition led to
ISS becoming tougher with its possible corporate clients, compared
to non-client corporations.85 Li inferred that ISS’s change in behav-
ior upon Glass Lewis’s entry into the market showed that an
increase in competition forced proxy advisory firms to act less on
the biases that are created by conflicts of interest.86 While increased
competition would undercut the idea that conflicts of interest cause
skewed corporate governance rankings, it is not often the case that
two proxy-advisory firms compete head-to-head.
Li’s findings showed that ISS’s average “For” recommendation
for shareholder proposals at large firms increased 11.9% after Glass
Lewis’s coverage began.87 This suggested that ISS “is more likely to
be lenient with its possible corporate clients before Glass Lewis en-
ters—after which it would be more difficult for ISS to treat client
firms more favorably.”88 Similarly, Li found that ISS’s negative rec-
ommendations for governance-related proposals submitted by
management increased by 2.7% after Glass Lewis entered.89
Changes in behavior from ISS were even more pronounced in the
context of executive compensation proposals from management.90
Consider the following example: Advisor A is providing vote rec-
ommendations to shareholders for Company C. If C is in the
market for consulting on issues related to corporate governance,
who will C seek help from? Of course, the answer is A. A is advising
83. See infra Part V.
84. Tao Li, Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest within the Proxy Advisory
Industry, MGMT. SCI., Dec. 2016, at 5.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 20.
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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potential adversaries on how good C’s corporate governance is, so
why not take advice from the most influential person in those deci-
sions? A, as the law stands, may enter into these agreements. Now
take into account the fact that Li has shown empirically that when
one firm is doing all of the services for a company (A doing all of
the work for C—both recommending for shareholders and consult-
ing for management), its recommendations and analysis changes
when another advisor, say B, enters the mix.91 It is thus Li’s asser-
tion that the entrance of a competitor leads to less biased votes,
which leads to investors having more accurate and neutral recom-
mendations for their proxies.92 This would indicate that proxy
advisory firms are less critical of management when their analysis
isn’t under the scrutiny of competitor proxy advisory firms. In
short, full-service advisory firms have less of a check on their powers
when they have no competition.
Another aspect of the problem is that companies have few op-
tions in choosing advisors given that the two preeminent firms are
ISS and Glass Lewis.93 When faced with the decision of hiring a
prestigious and widely known firm, such as ISS or Glass Lewis, as
compared with a lesser-known firm, the choice is obvious for most.
This is particularly true when your adversaries are using one of the
two services—who would you give business to in order to gain favor?
While Li may be the first to produce empirical support for the
assertion that conflicts of interest pose real problems, many others
generally support the assertion that proxy advisors suffer from in-
herent conflicts of interest in their business models.94 The extent of
such conflicts, however, has been downplayed by many—including
the advisory firms themselves.95
George W. Dent Jr.’s “Defense of Proxy Advisors” offers one of
the more prominent criticisms of the conflicts of interest argu-
ment.96  Focusing on ISS, Dent argues that concerns about conflicts
of interest are unwarranted because: (1) ISS is already subject to
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7.
94. See Cynthia E. Clark & Harry J. Van Buren III, Compound Conflicts of Interest in the US
Proxy System, 116 J. BUS. ETHICS 355, 361–62 (2013); see also U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, supra note 2, at 2–6; Emily Chasan, SEC to Examine Potential Conflicts of Interest at Proxy
Advisers, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/11/05/sec-to-
examine-potentialconflicts-of-interest-at-proxy-advisers/; Dent, supra note 80, at 1321–27.
95. Policy on Potential Conflicts of Interest, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., INC. (June
19, 2014), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/duediligence/2014-ISS-Conflicts-Policy-6-19-
2014.pdf; Conflict of Interest Statement, GLASS LEWIS http://www.glasslewis.com/conflict-of-in-
terest/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20180128213434/http://www.glasslewis.com/con
flict-of-interest/] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
96. See Dent, supra note 80.
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fiduciary duties under the Investment Adviser’s Act;97 (2) imposing
duties on smaller proxy advisory firms will diminish competition;98
(3) the growth of competing firms like Glass Lewis reduce concerns
of inherent coercion;99 and (4) the only individuals complaining
about conflicts of interest are corporate managers, who are upset
because of the role advisory firms have played in reducing the man-
agers’ power.100 In support of this position, Dent claims—
incorrectly—that “no complaints have been filed against [ISS] for
failing to discharge these duties.”101
Dent makes several good points—particularly his argument that
competition in the proxy industry reduces concerns about conflicts
of interest. But, several of his points are unpersuasive. First, the fact
that ISS is subject to a fiduciary standard under the Investment Ad-
viser’s Act fails to answer broader concerns regarding conflicts of
interest in the industry. ISS may be subject to a fiduciary standard,
but it is not the only firm in the marketplace. And some of those
competing firms, such as Glass Lewis, are not held to a fiduciary
standard.102
Second, the ISS example contradicts Dent’s point because it sug-
gests that more regulation is needed, not less. Dent suggests that
holding ISS to a fiduciary standard effectively controls conflicts of
interest. Many smaller firms, however, are not held to a fiduciary
standard under the current law. This suggests that regulators ought
to hold a larger variety of firms to a fiduciary standard, therefore
increasing the scope of regulation. Some might be concerned that
increasing the scope of fiduciary duties will serve as a barrier to
entry, therefore harming clients by reducing competition. These ar-
guments are unpersuasive, and ignore the reality that massive firms,
with a client-base worth $26 trillion, are currently exempt from fi-
duciary standards.
Third, Dent’s claim that only disgruntled corporate managers
are complaining about conflicts of interest misses the mark. This
Note has shown that a large and diverse array of stakeholders and
scholars have raised concerns about conflicts of interest, including
the Wall Street Journal and the SEC.103 Furthermore, corporate
manager complaints should not be disregarded entirely because of
a possible self-interested motive. Corporate managers are some of
97. See generally id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1327.
101. Dent, supra note 80, at 1323.
102. See Society of Corporate Secretaries Statement, supra note 8, at 4.
103. See supra notes 24, 36.
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the biggest players in corporate governance, and have many legiti-
mate reasons to criticize the status quo.
Finally, it is misleading to suggest that firms other than ISS are
“small.” Marco Consulting Group, an advisory firm on the “smaller”
side, has clients collectively worth $85 billion.104 Imposing fiduciary
duties on a firm of such power is unlikely to dissuade the firm from
continuing to do business, and therefore is unlikely to reduce
competition.
As the next section will point out, the proxy advisory industry is
dominated by a small number firms. Competition is important but,
at present time with barriers to competition already in place, impos-
ing fiduciary duties on the few powerful advisors would likely not
significantly harm them. For example, ISS’s prominence and suc-
cess has increased exponentially while under the imposition of such
duties due to the 2003 SEC Rules.105
The major rebuttal to the argument that proxy advisory firms suf-
fer from conflicts of interest that taint their recommendations is
the fact that these firms disclose all of their potential conflicts of
interest,106 and have put procedures in place to protect neutrality
through the use of internal software firewalls.107 The disclosures
used by some advisers, however, are merely blanket statements say-
ing that they “may have done business with the corporation that is
the subject of the report” and then providing an email that people
can use to ask for more information.108 Further, ISS, when provid-
ing consultant services on the corporate side, treats clients as
confidential.109 This inevitably creates difficulty when trying to ana-
lyze “disclosures.” These steps are simply not enough.
Whether the conflicts are actually problematic or potentially prob-
lematic is immaterial. Regulators should not allow conflicts like
these to exist in such an important industry. The growing promi-
nence of proxy advisory firms in recent years and the aggressive
tone taken by activist investors in the period from 2010 through the
present highlights the importance of maintaining neutrality. It is
not just by chance that the Wall Street Journal, the SEC, the U.S.
Congress, and many others have called for change in recent years.
104. Douglas Appell, Marco Founders Pass “Heavy Lifting” to Key Staffers, PENSIONS & INV.
ONLINE (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/20110418/PRINT/304189983/
marco-founders-pass-heavy-lifting-to-key-staffers.
105. See generally U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2.
106. See Dent, supra note 80, at 1323.
107. See Dent, supra note 80, at 1323; see also U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 2, at 10.
108. See CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., supra note 10, at 69.
109. See Dent, supra note 80, at 1324.
636 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:3
More oversight and transparency is needed to ensure that man-
agement and shareholders continue to have faith in voting
recommendations. The free market principals touted by anti-regu-
lators such as Professor Dent do not work in this industry at this
point in time. The market is not “free” or “fair”—it is dominated by
a select few. Those who employ the services of proxy advisors
should be confident in the recommendations and suggestions
made by those firms, and resolving conflicts of interests will go a
long way towards achieving that goal.
V. THE ROAD TO REFORM
The proxy advisory industry is in need of reform. The business
models upon which the major players operate are best suited to an
era of corporate governance that no longer exists. The rise of ac-
tivist investors and the increased importance of proxy advisors as a
response, mandates change in this area. Major conflicts of inter-
est—potential and actual—should not be allowed to exist in an area
that demands trust, neutrality, and loyalty in order to work effec-
tively. The reforms advocated for in this Note seek to remedy the
issue through increases in competition, legislation, voluntary filing
from other major firms that aren’t under the SEC’s jurisdiction,
and amending Form ADV used by the SEC for proxy advisors.
In advocating for these reforms, this Note makes two key assump-
tions. First, this Note presumes that recommendations of proxy
advisors are valued and used to make decisions regarding corporate
governance. While empirical evidence supports this assertion,110 dis-
agreement persists.111 Second, aside from very briefly, this Note, for
the most part, will not address in depth the practical political diffi-
culties with implementing these reforms—specifically in regard to
legislative reform.
110. Matteo Tonello, The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 8, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2012/04/08/the-influence-of-proxy-advisory-firm-voting-recommendations/; cf. Ertimur,
Ferri & Oesch, supra note 4, at 955 (“[Proxy Advisory Firms’] key economic role, rather than
identifying and promoting superior compensation practices, is processing and organizing a
substantial amount of executive pay information for institutional investors, reducing their
cost of making informed voting decisions.); Larcker et al., The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm
Voting Recommendations, supra note 33, at 1 (“However, the impact of [Proxy Advisory Firms]
on governance quality and shareholder value is still unknown.”).
111. Daines, supra note 27, at 441. Whether proxy opinions matter, and to what degree, is
an interesting question. That question, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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A. Increased Competition Through SEC Market Analysis and
Corresponding Legislation
The proxy advisory industry is dominated by a select few compa-
nies, with the top two—ISS and Glass Lewis—having the greatest
market share.112 As aforementioned, empirical evidence has shown
that the increase of competition in particular areas of proxy advis-
ing has led to different behavior by ISS in its recommendations.113
This suggests that an increase in competition will dilute the effects
that these conflicts of interest have on the proxy advisory indus-
try.114 Statistics and analysis aside, this seems to comport with
common sense. When only a select few players have control of a
market, a natural type of inherent coercion comes to exist.
The question then, has to be, how do we increase competition in
this field so as to decrease conflicts of interest? The answer is partly
by lowering barriers to entry.115 First and foremost, the SEC should
conduct research and write a report on the market conditions of
the proxy advisory industry and the barriers to entry that the mar-
ket poses to would-be competitors. Such a report would prove
valuable for those looking to enter the market and, if nothing else,
provide information on what makes being competitive in this area
most difficult. Second, after identifying the main barriers to compe-
tition, legislation should be put in place to aid in fostering
competition.
Legislation should be promulgated by Congress in accordance
with the SEC’s report on barriers to market entry. For example, if
capitalization were the main barrier to entry for aspiring proxy advi-
sory firms, then legislation should be implemented to specifically
address and remedy that issue. Providing subsidies in order to spur
competition (or squash it) has been used often in American legisla-
tion and widely throughout the world.116 Also common and widely
112. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13.
113. See Li, supra note 84.
114. See generally id.
115. It is worth briefly pointing out an implicit contradiction in my argument: the idea
that reducing barriers is necessary coupled with the fact that I will next argue for more regu-
lation (something seen as a traditional barrier to entry). The response to that, however, is
that more regulation, and as a result, trust by consumers, is as much of a benefit to advisory
firms as it is to shareholders.
116. See, e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (2012) (providing subsidies to
farmers during the Great Depression in order to decrease competition for agricultural prod-
ucts). See generally GLOB. FORUM ON COMPETITION, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION, STATE AIDS AND SUBSIDIES (2010), http://www.oecd.org/com-
petition/sectors/48070736.pdf.
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used are government sponsored grants to foster competition in a
particular area of the economy.117
If the main issue related to market competition, contrarily, were
due to a lack of interest, that too may be remedied through legisla-
tion. For example, in recent years there has been a vast shortage of
individuals within the United States who are qualified to work in
STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics)
fields.118 In response to this, the White House, in conjunction with
the Department of Education, put in place a program aimed at in-
creasing the amount of STEM jobs by 2020.119 The program
includes educational grants, the establishment of a committee of
agencies to work on solving the specific issue, and many other inno-
vative competition-increasing strategies.
Obviously, there are major differences between stimulating an in-
terest in STEM fields compared to proxy advisory work. The point,
however, is that if a lack of competition emanates from a lack of
interest or education surrounding the topic, it can be solved. This
goes to the greater point: whatever the multitude of different rea-
sons that may exist for the lack of competition in proxy advisory
services, historically speaking, there are legislative remedies availa-
ble. As such, the SEC should call for research into the matter and
Congress should respond through legislation accordingly, in order
to properly resolve this problem.
B. Legislation Overhauling the Industry as a Whole
When looking at avenues for reform, there is no better option
than implementing legislation. Codifying something into law en-
sures compliance and affirmatively states society’s interest in
following a certain policy course. Given its immense consequences,
implementing wide-ranging high-impact legislation is also the most
difficult avenue of reform. Putting aside the political difficulties in
implementing such legislation, Congress could implement a more
modest version of the Financial Choice Act of 2016 and the
CGRTA.
117. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Education’s Elusive Future, Storied Past, and the Fundamental
Inequities Between, 46 GA. L. REV. 557, 597–602 (2012) (examining the Obama Administra-
tion’s “competitive grant program” to foster competition in education).
118. Jonathan Rothwell, Short on STEM Talent, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 15, 2014,
8:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/09/15/the-stem-worker-
shortage-is-real.
119. See Science, Technology, Engineering and Math: Education for Global Leadership, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., www.ed.gov/stem [https://web.archive.org/web/20180129002056/https://www.ed.
gov/stem] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
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The Financial Choice Act of 2016 and the CGRTA contemplated
a regulatory overhaul of the proxy advisory industry.120 Had it
passed, it would have required registration with the SEC, disclosure
of procedures for formulating recommendations, disclosures of
conflicts of interest, and the creation of an ombudsman to receive
complaints.121 Both bills were met with heavy criticism, therefore,
the practicality of implementing a carbon copy of either of these
bills is bleak. This Note proposes that legislation should be imple-
mented that requires proxy advisors to register under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1933, thereby imposing fiduciary duties upon
proxy advisors in a way similar to how § 206 of the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940 does.122 Unlike the CGRTA, however, this
legislation will not ask for disclosure of methodologies or organiza-
tional structures, and it will not require programs for combatting
conflicts of interest.
Removing a provision forcing action on the part of proxy advi-
sory firms in dealing with conflicts of interest goes against one of
the core tenets of this Note. However, it might be necessary for pur-
poses of political compromise. The imposition of fiduciary duties
on proxy advisors, as envisioned by this legislation, would, for now,
put a check on advisors by allowing consumers to sue when actual
conflicts of interest arise that create bias in voting recommenda-
tions. The imposition of a fiduciary duty on firms like Glass Lewis
would resolve conflicts of interest to an extent similar to how proxy
advisors being forced to implement entire programs would resolve
conflicts of interest. In the current political climate, legislation forc-
ing corporations to put into place systems to deal with these issues
and the other requirements of the CGRTA are impractical and have
historically failed time and time again.
C. Greater Imposition on ISS and Voluntary Inclusion of ADV Forms
As previously stated, ISS is registered under the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940.123 The firm must therefore annually file an “ADV
Form.”124 An ADV Form is a form that provides the SEC with basic
120. Financial Choice Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016); Corporate Govern-
ance Reform and Transparency Act, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong. (2016).
121. H.R. 5311 § 15H.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012) (imposing fiduciary duties on proxy advisors); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a–77aa (2012) (not limiting fiduciary duties on proxy advisors).
123. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., supra note 7, at 2.
124. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 16 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_invest
man/rplaze-042012.pdf.
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information about advisers, such as the amount of assets under
management, principal business locations, and other important in-
formation.125 One way that regulators could bypass the tedious
legislative process would be to simply beef up the ADV Form.
The ADV Form, in its current existence, is short, skeletal, and
lacking a lot of in depth information that might be useful in deter-
mining threats to institutional investors.126 While it does make a
cursory attempt to identify conflicts of interest, it is not enough.127
Since ISS is already under the jurisdiction of the SEC, changing the
ADV Form would not require an Act of Congress. Thus, this Note
calls for a notice and comment period to discuss the implications of
asking ISS for more detailed conflicts of interest information on
required ADV Forms—so as to better educate the SEC on how they
might affect shareholders.
Finally, it is worth pointing out the common practice of “volun-
tary filers” of the SEC.128 On the corporate side, many public
companies who are otherwise not required by the government to
file with the SEC, regularly do.129 These companies file 10-Q, 10-K,
and 8-K forms on an annual basis that provide the SEC with a vast
amount of information.130 While these forms do not apply to advi-
sory firms, the ADV Forms do. The voluntary completion of the
ADV Form by advisors such as Glass Lewis would go a very long way
towards gaining—and maintaining—trust in the services provided
by third-party proxy advisors.
CONCLUSION
The increasing role of proxy advisory firms in the sphere of cor-
porate governance mandates change. No longer are proxy advisory
firms minor players in the sphere of corporate governance; these
firms have essentially become indispensable in the eyes of the insti-
tutional investor clients that they serve. The government must
125. Fast Answers: Form ADV, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-an-
swers/answersformadvhtm.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2011).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Securities Act Rules Question 131.07, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last updated Nov. 6,
2017) (defining “voluntary filer” as an “issuer that submits Exchange Act reports on a volun-
tary basis”).
129. GLOSSARY: VOLUNTARY FILER, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2018).
130. Matthew J. Stout, What is a Voluntary Filer?, OTCLAWYERS, http://otclawyers.com/
what-is-a-voluntary-sec-filer/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20180129004345/http://otclaw
yers.com/what-is-a-voluntary-sec-filer/] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
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respond to this trend by increasing regulation in the area of corpo-
rate governance. With each of the big firms representing a total of
$41.5 trillion in equity throughout the world,131 it is only a matter of
time until one of the proxy advisory firms causes severe economic
harm to its clients, a corporation, and/or the corporation’s public
shareholders.
It is paramount that shareholders trust the recommendations
given by these firms. In particular, shareholders must be able to
trust that recommendations are not biased or impacted by the con-
flicts of interest that all firms willingly acknowledge exist. The
wrong advice for the wrong reasons could potentially lead to enor-
mous shareholder injury—an injury that the SEC is tasked with
preventing.132 Allowing such brazen conflicts of interest to exist
runs counter to, and is impossible to reconcile with, a firm’s sup-
posed ability to make unbiased recommendations on behalf of their
clients. Whereas all other areas of finance and law directly ad-
dresses and resolves conflicts of interest, it is unclear why conflicts
of interest issues for proxy advisory firms remains unaddressed by
those in control of protecting shareholders—especially given the
large amount of money that is involved.
The government, through Congress and the SEC, has a number
of options on the table. This Note seeks to shed light on those op-
tions and effectively advocate for their exploration. Legislation,
notice and comment periods, and voluntary disclosure by firms
through ADV Forms would increase shareholder trust and decrease
the negative effects that conflicts of interest pose to proxy advisory
firms. The government should act now in exploring this issue to
prevent the potential for future shareholder injury.
131. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 2.
132. About the SEC, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/about.shtml [https://
web.archive.org/web/20180129004429/https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml] (last visited Jan.
26, 2018).
